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Abstract 
A number of studies claim that aggregate managerial decision variables, such as aggregate equity 
issuance, have power to predict stock or bond market returns. Recent research argues that these 
results may be driven by an aggregate time-series version of Schultz’s (2003) pseudo market 
timing bias. We use standard simulation techniques to estimate the size of the aggregate pseudo 
market timing bias for a variety of predictive regressions based on managerial decision variables. 
We find that the bias can explain only about one percent of the predictive power of the equity 
share in new issues, and that it is also much too small to overturn prior inferences about the 
predictive power of corporate investment plans, insider trading, dividend initiations, or the 
maturity of corporate debt issues. 
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I.  Introduction 
Market timing is the tendency of firms to issue equity before low equity market returns. 
In contrast, pseudo market timing, as recently defined by Schultz (2003), is the tendency of firms 
to issue equity following high returns. In small samples, pseudo market timing can give the 
appearance of genuine timing. Consider an extreme example of pure pseudo market timing with 
only two returns. If the first return is high, equity issues rise; if the first return is low, equity 
issues fall. The first return can be mechanically explained ex post: Relatively low equity issues 
precede a high first return and relatively high equity issues precede a low first return. Even 
though the returns are random, equity issues “predict” returns in sample more often than not. 
 In a provocative article, Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2004a) argue that an aggregate 
version of the pseudo market timing bias explains why the variable in Baker and Wurgler (2000), 
the equity share in new equity and debt issues, predicts stock market returns in sample. While 
Butler et al. focus their critique on a particular link between financing patterns and stock returns, 
their general argument—that the pseudo market timing bias extends to time-series predictive 
regressions—is of considerably broader interest, because virtually every aggregate managerial 
decision variable that has been used in predictive regressions, not just equity issuance, is 
correlated with returns in the direction that induces a bias. 
 Consider the following examples. Seyhun (1992, 1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
find that high aggregate insider buying appears to predict high stock market returns. However, 
aggregate insider buying increases as stock prices fall, raising the possibility that their result is 
driven by the bias. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) find that a high ratio of long-term 
debt issuance to total debt issuance appears to predict lower excess bond returns. However, as 
Butler et al. (2004b) observe, long-term debt issues are relatively more common as interest rates 
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fall (and excess bond returns rise), again raising the potential for bias. Lamont (2000) finds that 
corporate investment plans forecast lower stock market returns, but planned investment increases 
with stock prices. And, finally, Baker and Wurgler (2004) find that the aggregate rate of dividend 
initiation is inversely related to the future returns on dividend payers over nonpayers. But again, 
the initiation rate increases with the relative returns on payers. Thus, in each of these papers, in 
addition to those involving equity issuance, the bias is a potentially serious concern. The size of 
the bias needs to be empirically pinned down before any of the above results can be accepted, or 
rejected, with confidence.1 
 In this paper, we empirically estimate the aggregate pseudo market timing bias that 
affects predictive regressions based on managerial decision variables. We start by observing that 
none of this is a fundamentally new question in asset pricing or time series econometrics. While 
Butler et al. (2004a) do not make the connection, aggregate pseudo market timing is simply a 
new name for the small-sample bias studied by Stambaugh (1986, 1999), Mankiw and Shapiro 
(1986), Nelson and Kim (1993), Elliott and Stock (1994), Kothari and Shanken (1997), 
Campbell and Yogo (2003), Amihud and Hurvich (2004), Lewellen (2004), Polk, Thompson, 
and Vuolteenaho (2004) and others. These studies focus on valuation ratios, like dividend yield 
or market-to-book, which exhibit an extreme and mechanical form of pseudo market timing—for 
example, when the market crashes, the dividend yield automatically rises. Our predictors are 
different, but the bias is the same, and it can be estimated using the same standard methods. 
                                                
1 It is important to note that the aggregate pseudo market timing bias discussed in this paper, and in Butler et al. 
(2004a,b), is a purely time-series phenomenon. It is not the bias emphasized by Schultz (2003), who discusses the 
potential for bias in “event time” studies of abnormal IPO returns. There, the problem arises when the number of 
firms going public increases following high abnormal returns on previous IPOs. For studies of that conceptually 
distinct type of bias, see Schultz (2003, 2004), Ang, Gu, and Hochberg (2004), Dahlquist and de Jong (2004), and 
Viswanathan and Wei (2004). For a general discussion, see Ritter (2003). 
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Specifically, when the predictor variable is stationary, and all of the managerial decision 
predictors we consider are theoretically stationary by construction, it is straightforward to run 
simulations and assess the magnitude of the small-sample bias induced by aggregate pseudo 
market timing. In these simulations, we impose the null hypothesis of no genuine market timing 
and varying degrees of pseudo market timing, mechanically tying the equity share and other 
candidate predictor variables to contemporaneous returns.  
Our simulation results are, in a sense, a big letdown. Contrary to the conclusions of 
Butler et al. (2004a,b), the aggregate pseudo market timing bias is only a minor consideration for 
every variable we consider. The results can be described in terms of the theoretical determinants 
of the bias. As shown in Stambaugh (1986, 1999), the bias is most severe when the sample is 
small (on the order of 1/T), the predictor is persistent, and its innovations are highly correlated 
with returns. As it turns out, empirically relevant values for these parameters are unable to 
generate a significant bias.  
For example, aggregate pseudo market timing, of the degree observed in sample, has less 
than a one percent chance of reproducing the predictive power of the equity share variable. A 
reasonable point estimate is that one percent of its OLS coefficient is due to pseudo market 
timing. Even when we impose, counterfactually, pure pseudo market timing, forcing the 
correlation of innovations in the equity share and returns to one, approximately 90% of the OLS 
coefficient remains unexplained. And when we further increase the autocorrelation of the equity 
share by three standard deviations from its actual level, over 80% of the OLS coefficient still 
remains unexplained, and pseudo market timing of this sort still has less than a one percent 
chance of equaling the actual predictive coefficient. The bottom line is that in a sample of 75 
years, small-sample bias is quite modest compared with the equity share’s actual coefficient. 
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Results for other predictors are qualitatively similar—in no case we consider is the bias large 
enough to cast doubt on OLS-based inferences about predictive power. In summary, the 
aggregate pseudo market timing bias is a minor concern for the predictive regressions based on 
managerial decision variables that appear in the literature.  
To reach closure on the issue, we briefly revisit the exercises in Butler et al. (2004a) that 
led them to conclude, apparently incorrectly, that small-sample bias drives the equity share’s 
predictive coefficient. We note that Butler et al. do not present any direct estimates of the bias, as 
we do here, but instead build a case based on four indirect exercises. We observe that while some 
of these exercises represent robustness tests that may be of interest to an outside investor, others 
are problematic, and none is actually closely related to the small-sample bias issue. Thus, their 
results present no real conflict with the simulation results. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the aggregate pseudo market timing 
bias and places it within an empirical framework that can be used to run simulations. Section III 
describes the data. Section IV reports simulation results. Section V comments further on the 
equity share variable. Section VI concludes.  
 
II.  Estimating the aggregate pseudo market timing bias 
A. Empirical framework 
 An important conceptual point is that the aggregate pseudo market timing bias—in other 
words, the pseudo market timing bias in the context of time-series predictive regressions—is just 
a different name for an issue that is well understood in the financial econometrics literature. A 
common empirical framework is the system used by Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), Stambaugh 
(1986), and subsequent authors:  
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where r denotes returns on the stock market, for example, and X is a candidate predictor variable, 
such as aggregate equity issuance. Eq. (1) is the predictive regression, while Eq. (2) describes the 
evolution of the predictor. The contemporaneous covariance between the disturbances is σuv. We 
assume that the predictor is stationary, so that |d|<1.  
To connect this framework to aggregate pseudo market timing, we adapt and (closely) 
paraphrase the following discussion from Stambaugh (1999, p. 379), in which he illustrates why 
the OLS estimate bˆ  is biased in its simplest possible setting. Consider repeated samples of only 
two observations, (r1, X0) and (r2, X1), so that bˆ  in each sample is just the slope of the line 
connecting these points, 
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= . Suppose b = 0, meaning that managers do not have genuine 
market timing ability; d ≈  1, so that innovations to equity issuance are highly persistent; and σuv 
> 0, meaning that managers are pseudo market timers, increasing equity issuance as stock prices 
rise. Consider those samples in which the first return is relatively low, (r2 – r1) > 0, or u2 > u1 
(since b = 0). On average here, u1 is negative, and because σuv > 0, v1 is also on average negative, 
and so (X1 – X0) is on average negative. Thus, bˆ < 0 on average. Now consider samples in which 
the first return is relatively high. On average here, u1 is positive, hence v1 is also on average 
positive, and therefore (X1 – X0) is on average positive. Again, bˆ  < 0 on average. Thus, on 
average across all samples, one will see a negative relation between equity issuance and 
subsequent returns, even though no timing ability exists. (In settings where σuv < 0, then bˆ  > 0 
on average.) This is the aggregate pseudo market timing bias.  
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This two-period example highlights the three main determinants of the bias. First, as the 
pseudo market timing correlation σuv goes to zero, the bias disappears, because the signs of u1 
and v1 are no longer connected. Second, as the persistence of the predictor d goes to zero, the 
bias shrinks, because then the sign of (X1 – X0) is less tightly linked to the sign of v1 and thus to 
the sign of (r2 – r1). But even when d = 0, there is still some correlation and thus some bias. 
Third, as the number of observations T increases, the bias approaches zero, because (with b = 0) 
the scatter of points becomes a horizontal cloud of these two-point clusters. 
In the T-period case, Stambaugh (1986, 1999) shows that the size of the bias in bˆ  when u 
and v are distributed normally in the system above is 
 ]ˆ[]ˆ[ 2 ddEbbE
v
uv
−=−
σ
σ . (3) 
The downward small-sample bias in the OLS estimate of d is shown by Kendall (1954) to be 
approximately –(1 + 3d)/T. So, mentally substituting this into Eq. (3), one sees that the pseudo 
market timing correlation, the predictor’s persistence, and the sample size remain the key 
determinants of bias in the T-period case.  
B. Simulation procedure 
As mentioned in the Introduction, a large literature has considered the bias in bˆ  when X 
is a scaled-price variable like the aggregate dividend yield or book-to-market. Because dividends 
and book values are persistent, innovations in the dividend yield and the aggregate market-to-
book ratio are highly correlated with contemporaneous returns, and thus an extreme, mechanical 
pseudo market timing correlation arises. While our predictors are different, the nature of the 
underlying bias is identical, and it can be estimated using the same empirical techniques 
developed in, for example, Nelson and Kim (1993) and Kothari and Shanken (1997). 
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In particular, when the predictor is stationary, it is straightforward to simulate Eqs. (1) 
and (2) to determine the size of the bias. The predictor variables we consider are theoretically 
stationary by construction (although in any given small sample, one might not be able to reject a 
unit root). In the simulations, we impose the null hypothesis of no predictability (b = 0) and vary 
the pseudo market timing correlation, σuv, and the other key parameters, d and T, to see whether 
a significant bias in bˆ  can be generated for empirically relevant parameters.  
An example illustrates the basic procedure. In our benchmark simulations, we use the 
empirically most relevant parameter set: the bias-adjusted estimate of d ( T dd
ˆ31ˆ ++ ); the empirical 
distribution, and hence the correlation, of OLS estimates of u and v; and the number of 
observations actually available for the given predictor as T. We then simulate 100 + T values for 
r and X, starting with the actual X0 and drawing with replacement from the empirical joint 
distribution of u and v. We throw away the first 100 values, leaving a sample size of T, which we 
use to compute a simulated OLS estimate bˆ . (When we examine three-year cumulative returns, 
the sample size for the regressions is 3T .) We repeat this procedure 50,000 times to plot the 
distribution of simulated OLS estimates, and then locate the actual estimate in this distribution. 
We then vary one or more of the parameters, generate a new simulated distribution, locate the 
actual OLS estimate there, and so forth. 
An alternative approach is to compute reduced-bias p-values directly with the recently 
developed methods of Amihud and Hurvich (2004) and Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho 
(2004). These two procedures lead to virtually identical inferences, and so we focus primarily on 
the simulation results, which allow us to consider situations where the degree of pseudo-market 
timing and the level of persistence in equity issues are counterfactually high. 
 
 8
III.  Data 
A. Predictor variables 
 We focus on six aggregate managerial decision variables. Five have previously been 
examined in a predictive regression context, and all six, based on the a priori considerations 
outlined in the Introduction, are likely to be subject to at least some degree of aggregate pseudo 
market timing bias. We replicate the methodology of the original studies where possible. When 
faced with a choice about the return prediction horizon, however, theory is no guide, so we use 
the horizons that are “strongest” or most emphasized in the original studies. 
The first four predictor variables are used to forecast one-year-ahead real stock market 
returns. The equity share in new issues, i.e., the ratio of aggregate gross equity issuance to 
aggregate gross equity plus debt issuance, is derived from the Federal Reserve Bulletin data and 
is discussed in Baker and Wurgler (2000) and Butler et al. (2004a). Henderson, Jegadeesh, and 
Weisbach (2004) study the equity share variable using international data. By construction, this 
variable isolates the security choice decision from the level-of-external-finance decision. In the 
Bulletin data, equity issues include common and preferred, and debt issues include public and 
private. The annual series covers 1927 through 2001.  
Detrended equity issuance is also based on the Bulletin annual gross equity issuance 
series. We take the log difference of aggregate gross equity issuance in year t and the average 
gross equity issuance over the previous five years (t-1 through t-6). This annual series covers 
1932 though 2001. We are not aware of a prior study that uses exactly this variable.2 It gives a 
different perspective on aggregate equity issuance than the equity share variable and will prove 
useful in our discussion of that variable. 
                                                
2 See Lamont (2002) on the predictive power of net new lists and Dichev (2004) on net equity capital flows.  
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Planned investment growth is studied by Lamont (2000). This series is based on a 
Commerce Department survey of firms’ planned capital expenditure in the coming year. Lamont 
defines real planned investment growth as planned capital investment in year t divided by actual 
capital investment in t-1 all minus the growth in the national income accounts’ nonresidential 
fixed investment deflator. As Lamont notes, investment plans for year t are reported as of 
February of t. The annual series of real planned investment growth for 1948 through 1992 is 
from his website.3 
 Aggregate insider buying is studied by Seyhun (1992, 1998) and Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001). Seyhun shared with us the monthly series, derived from the SEC’s Ownership Reporting 
System file, on the fraction of publicly traded firms with net insider buying, as plotted in Seyhun 
(1998, p. 117). We average this series across months to construct an annual insider buying series 
from 1975 through 1994. 
 The long-term share in debt issues, i.e., the ratio of aggregate long-term debt issuance to 
aggregate short- plus long-term debt issuance, is used to forecast cumulative three-year excess 
returns on long-term government bonds in Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003). The debt 
issuance data is from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.4 Short-term debt is primarily bank 
loans, and issuance is defined as the level of short-term credit market debt outstanding. Long-
term debt is primarily corporate bonds. Under the assumption that one-tenth of long-term debt 
outstanding matures each year, issuance is defined as the annual change in the level of long-term 
debt outstanding plus one-tenth the lagged level. The long-term share series is annual from 1953 
through 2000. 
                                                
3 http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/oal4/research/publicplans.xls. 
4 This data comes from corporate balance sheets, includes a broader range of liabilities, and so does not match the 
totals from the Federal Reserve Bulletin that we use in computing the equity share in new issues. 
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The aggregate rate of dividend initiation, i.e. the percentage of the previous year’s 
surviving nonpayers that paid positive dividends this year, is used by Baker and Wurgler (2004) 
to forecast three-year cumulative excess returns of dividend payers over nonpayers. They derive 
aggregate dividend payment series from aggregations of Compustat data. The dividend initiation 
series is annual from 1963 through 2000. 
We refer the reader to the corresponding papers for more details on these variables. We 
omit summary statistics, because all of our analysis uses a standardized version of each predictor 
that has zero mean and unit variance across the full sample period. 
B. Returns 
 Real annual stock market returns are based on the CRSP NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-
weighted and equal-weighted return series, converted to real terms using the Consumer Price 
Index from Ibbotson Associates. The mean value-weighted (equal-weighted) real stock market 
return from 1928 through 2002 is 8.10% (13.30%) and the standard deviation is 20.47% 
(30.91%). Lamont’s (2000) planned investment variable is dated the end of February, so we 
match it to subsequent March-February stock market returns. 
Excess returns on long-term Treasury bonds over bills are from Ibbotson Associates; their 
government bond returns series uses data from the Wall Street Journal for 1977 through 2000 
and the CRSP Government Bond File for 1976 and earlier. The mean three-year cumulative 
excess return for years starting with 1954 through 1998 (and ending with 1956 through 2000) is 
2.06% with a standard deviation of 16.71%.  
Finally, excess returns on dividend payers over nonpayers are based on the book-value-
weighted return indexes of payers and nonpayers derived from CRSP and Compustat and 
described in Baker and Wurgler (2004). The mean three-year cumulative excess return on payers 
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over nonpayers for years starting with 1964 through 1998 (and ending with 1966 through 2000) 
is 3.09% with a standard deviation of 37.99%.  
We use rt to denote the return in year t and Rt+k to denote the k-year cumulative return 
that starts with the year t return.5 
 
IV. Simulation results 
A. Predictive regressions based on equity issuance 
Table 1 shows simulation results for predictive regressions using aggregate equity 
issuance variables for one-year-ahead stock market returns. Panel A reports simulations for the 
equity share and Panel B considers detrended equity issuance. The left side of the table contains 
the simulation inputs, which are always based on the null of no predictability (b = 0), and the 
right side reports the simulated distribution of the predictive regression coefficient and locates 
the actual OLS coefficient in this distribution. Figure 1 presents some of the interesting cases 
graphically. The basic approach is to start with empirically relevant parameter values, to 
determine the size of the bias in practice, and then proceed to progressively more extreme 
counterfactual parameter values to get a sense of what would be required for pseudo market 
timing to explain a given predictive coefficient.  
Accordingly, in the first row of Panel A, we start with a benchmark parameter set that 
includes a bias-adjusted estimate of the equity share’s autocorrelation, the empirical correlation 
of u and v (under b = 0), and a sample size of 75. The simulations indicate that the aggregate 
pseudo market timing bias is small, if not negligible, for this empirically relevant parameter set. 
                                                
5 The excess returns on long-term bonds (RGLt+3 - RGSt+3) and dividend payers (RDt+3 – RNDt+3) are measured in logs 
and summed across overlapping three-year periods starting with year t: 
( )∑
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The actual OLS coefficient is -6.44 (and the unreported OLS heteroskedasticity robust t = -3.33). 
In contrast, the average simulated coefficient, under the null of no predictability, is only -0.07. 
Thus, as a point estimate, the bias accounts for 1.03% of the equity share’s actual coefficient on 
value-weighted returns. Using the analytic expression for the bias in Eq. (3) leads to similar 
results, with bbias-adjusted = -6.34.6 The one-tail p-value shows that there is only a 0.4% probability 
that the bias would lead to a coefficient as negative as the actual coefficient.7 These results are 
presented graphically in Panel A of Figure 1. The actual coefficient, marked with a diamond, 
falls in the left tail of the simulated distribution.  
In the second set of parameter values, we consider the counterfactual case of pure pseudo 
market timing, setting the correlation of u and v to one. To do this, we create a new v that is 
equal to u but standardized so that it has the same standard deviation as the empirical v series 
(i.e., 
u
v
s
s
tt uv ⋅=  where s denotes sample standard deviation). The second row of Table 1 shows 
that even pure pseudo market timing generates only a small bias given empirical values of d and 
T. In particular, the mean simulated coefficient is only 11.37% as large as the actual coefficient, 
and there is only a 1.1% probability that extreme pseudo market timing of this type would lead to 
a coefficient as low as the actual coefficient. This case is plotted in Panel B of Figure 1.  
                                                
6 Amihud and Hurvich (2004) propose an estimator for the standard error of the bias-adjusted estimate. Because the 
distribution of b is not always symmetric, we present one- and two-tailed p-values from the simulations instead. 
None of the inferences in Tables 1 and 2 is materially affected. For example, the Amihud and Hurvich one-tailed p-
values are 0.0036 for the case of value-weighted returns on the equity share in new issues and 0.0004 for the 
corresponding case with equal-weighted returns.  
7 Note that the simulations presume knowledge of the parameters d and σuv. We input the bias-adjusted estimate of d 
and use the empirical distribution of the OLS residuals u and v. So, the p-values in Table 1 and 2 are not exact. Polk, 
Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2004) use a neural network to implement the theoretical result in Jansson and Moreira 
(2003), developing a conditional t-statistic and a set of critical values that do not require knowledge of d and σuv. 
Like the Amihud and Hurvich standard errors, this procedure produces almost identical inferences. For example, 
one-tailed p-values are 0.0044 for the case of value-weighted returns on the equity share in new issues and 0.0004 
for the corresponding case with equal-weighted returns. 
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In the third parameter set, we again assume pure market timing, and try to further 
increase the bias by increasing d to three standard errors above its bias-adjusted estimate to 
0.819. Even when one tilts these two parameters as far as possible toward pseudo market timing, 
the average simulated coefficient is still only 16.43% of the actual coefficient in a sample of 75 
observations. The simulated distribution is in Panel C of Figure 1.  
In the fourth and most extreme parameter set, we simultaneously consider pure market 
timing, a counterfactually high predictor autocorrelation, and a counterfactually low ten 
observations. Only in this extreme case is the aggregate pseudo market timing bias on the order 
of the actual coefficient. The simulated distribution is plotted in Panel D of Figure 1. The actual 
coefficient falls near the middle. This case highlights the fact that the bias is fundamentally a 
(very) small-sample problem.  
 The remaining rows in Panel A of Table 1 repeat these exercises for the case of equal-
weighted market returns. The equity share has an actual coefficient of -11.92 (unreported OLS t 
= -3.49 and bbias-adjusted = -11.78) for equal-weighted returns. We modify the parameters as 
before, starting with the empirically relevant case and proceeding to extreme values. The biases 
here are also very small; under empirically relevant parameters, the point estimate is that the bias 
accounts for 0.83% of the actual coefficient. Panel B considers another measure of aggregate 
equity issuance, log deviation from a five-year moving average, which has an actual predictive 
coefficient of -7.83 (unreported OLS t = -4.05 and bbias-adjusted = -7.61) for value-weighted returns 
and -16.50 (unreported OLS t = -3.79 and bbias-adjusted = -16.19) for equal-weighted returns. The 
pattern of results is similar for this variable, indicating that it is also unaffected by the bias. For 
brevity, we do not present these results graphically. 
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In summary, the aggregate pseudo market timing bias has only a very small effect on 
predictive regressions based on aggregate equity issuance variables. The results clearly reject the 
conclusion of Butler et al. (2004a) that the equity share’s actual predictive coefficient is due to 
pseudo market timing. In fact, only an extremely counterfactual parameter set can generate a bias 
that approaches the observed coefficient. 
B. Predictive regressions based on other managerial decisions 
Table 2 considers the effect of the aggregate pseudo market timing bias on a range of 
other predictors derived from managerial decisions. As suggested in the Introduction, many such 
predictors are likely to have, or already known to have, the correlation structure that induces a 
bias. It is an empirical question whether the bias is big enough to affect previous inferences. We 
report simulations using value-weighted returns in the first two panels of Table 2; results for 
equal-weighted returns are similar. 
Panel A considers the real planned investment growth variable examined in Lamont 
(2000). The actual OLS coefficient for standardized real planned investment growth is -7.15 
(unreported OLS t = -3.74 and bbias-adjusted = -7.11). We vary the parameter set as usual, starting 
with the empirically relevant case. The correlation between innovations in investment growth is 
positive but not that high, and the persistence of this predictor is low. The upshot is no bias. 
Indeed, even in the fourth row, where we consider the extreme counterfactual parameter set, 
there is only a 16.2% chance of observing a coefficient as negative as the actual coefficient under 
the null of no predictability. 
Panel B looks at aggregate insider buying, as studied by Seyhun (1992, 1998) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001).8 The actual predictive coefficient on standardized insider buying is 
                                                
8 Seyhun (1998) does not report formal predictive regressions. Instead, he reports a suggestive difference in average 
one-year-ahead returns conditional on aggregate “buy” signals (defined as 55% or more firms being net buyers over 
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4.99 (unreported OLS t = 2.14 and bbias-adjusted = 4.04). Insiders are contrarian, as reflected in the 
highly negative correlation between insider buying and contemporaneous returns. Further, there 
are only 19 observations on this variable, further increasing the potential for small-sample bias. 
Indeed, although the predictor’s autocorrelation is not high, this is the variable where the bias has 
the most bite. Nonetheless, the first row of Panel B reports the bottom line, which is that under 
empirically relevant parameters, the simulated coefficient equals or exceeds the actual coefficient 
only 10.5% of the time. As before, it takes extreme parameters to generate a bias as large as the 
actual coefficient.9 
Panel C considers the long-term share in debt issues as a predictor of three-year excess 
returns on government bonds. Baker et al. (2003) find that when interest rates fall (and thus 
excess bond returns are high), corporations are issuing more long-term debt relative to short-term 
debt. But despite the strong autocorrelation in the long-term share, and only 15 non-overlapping 
observations, the bias turns out to be negligible.10 In the benchmark parameter set, the average 
simulated coefficient is only 8.33% of the actual coefficient (similarly, the unreported bbias-adjusted 
= -9.27). The simulated coefficient is as negative as the OLS coefficient only 2.9% of the time. 
Only extreme counterfactual parameters generate an average simulated coefficient in the ballpark 
of the actual coefficient. These results reject the conclusion of Butler et al. (2004b), who argue 
that the long-term share’s coefficient is due to aggregate pseudo market timing. 
                                                                                                                                                       
the prior 12 months) and aggregate “sell” signals (defined as 45% or fewer firms being net buyers). Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) do present formal tests (for example, p. 96).  
9 Increasing the autocorrelation of insider buying by three standard errors above the bias-adjusted d leads to a value 
near or above 1.00. The same happens with the long-term share. Such an autocorrelation can be ruled out on 
theoretical grounds, so we cap the counterfactually high d value at 0.95. This is still well over two standard 
deviations above the bias-adjusted OLS estimate of d. 
10 We do not report the overstated OLS t-statistics from regressions with overlapping returns. 
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Finally, Panel D considers the aggregate rate of dividend initiation as a predictor of the 
three-year cumulative excess return on dividend payers over nonpayers. This is the regression 
emphasized in Baker and Wurgler (2004). The residual correlation indicates that when the return 
on payers is relatively high, nonpayers initiate dividends at a high rate, suggesting the possibility 
of bias. In addition, only 12 non-overlapping observations are available here. However, the 
simulations indicate that there is only a 4.4% chance of observing the actual coefficient under the 
empirical parameters. In the benchmark parameter set, the average simulated coefficient is only 
9.48% of the actual coefficient (similarly, the unreported bbias-adjusted = -22.21). In this setting, it 
is difficult to generate a large bias even under extreme counterfactual parameters.  
 In summary, the aggregate pseudo market timing bias is only a minor concern for the 
predictive regressions based on managerial decision variables that appear in the literature. Of 
course, although we have found no case in which inferences based on OLS estimates would be 
seriously misleading, good practice dictates that the potential for small-sample bias be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis going forward. 
 
V.  On the robustness of the equity share variable 
The simulation results show rigorously that aggregate pseudo market timing has little 
effect on the equity share variable in particular, and therefore that the conclusion of Butler et al. 
(2004a) is incorrect. To draw the issue to a close, we briefly review how those authors reached 
their conclusion, and where they may have erred. 
Butler et al. present no actual estimates of the bias. Indeed, they do not even mention that 
it is a small-sample problem, which eventually disappears regardless of the pseudo market timing 
correlation. Instead, they build a case based on four indirect exercises. We discuss these in turn. 
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We will show that while one or two of the Butler et al. exercises can be seen as useful robustness 
tests, of interest to an outside investor aiming to exploit the phenomenon, none presents a strong 
link between the equity share’s predictive coefficient and small-sample bias, and so there is 
ultimately no conflict with our simulations.  
A.  Sensitivity to “outliers” 
Butler et al. begin by presenting evidence that the equity share and returns are positively 
correlated around a dozen historical stock market events (see their Figures 1 through 3 and Table 
4). As they point out, and as is confirmed more systematically in our Table 1, such a correlation 
structure suggests the possibility of pseudo market timing bias. Butler et al. then remove five 
years of the sample, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1973, and 1974, arguing that the events of these years, the 
Great Crash and the oil crises, were unpredictable and hence the associated fall in the equity 
share that occurs in these years could not be due to genuine market timing. Observing that the 
equity share is insignificant in the remaining sample (see their Table 3), the authors propose that 
aggregate pseudo market timing, centered on these five years, is driving the full-sample 
predictive relationship. 
This exercise makes a statement about robustness, but sheds little light on small-sample 
bias. There are several reasons why this link cannot be made. First, a positive correlation 
between returns and the equity share is equally predicted by both the genuine and pseudo market 
timing hypotheses. Under pseudo market timing, the fall in the equity share around large 
negative returns is the definition of the effect; under genuine market timing, a fall in prices 
implies less overvaluation, and hence less of a reason to prefer equity. Thus, the simple fact that 
the equity share and returns both fall in a given period does not identify the observation as any 
more likely to be associated with pseudo market timing. 
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Second, although Butler et al. offer a list of events as having the potential to induce bias 
(see their Table 4), they only delete years corresponding to two such events. But this arbitrary 
choice turns out to be important. If one removes five additional years from the sample, 1940, 
1941, 1987, 1990, and 2001, all of which appear on their own selected list of “unanticipated 
events” of concern, a significant coefficient actually reappears.11 But in what sense are the events 
that drove stocks in these five years—the German invasion of France, Pearl Harbor, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, the Crash of 1987, and September 11th—any more or less predictable than 
the Great Crash and the oil crises? 
Third, and most fundamentally, under the null hypothesis no return is predictable. The 
notion that predictability can be tested by throwing out individual data points based on a 
qualitative judgment that certain events are unpredictable seems strange from the start. After all, 
the aim is to test the null hypothesis of no predictability. Indeed, given the nature of the market 
timing hypothesis, it seems particularly strange to throw out potentially highly informative 
periods of possible market correction, like the Great Crash. 
 Nonetheless, even though these five data points cannot be attached to pseudo as opposed 
to genuine market timing, it does seem striking that removing them reduces the OLS coefficient 
by as much as 57.61%.12 As a generic observation about robustness, this still seems damaging. 
Yet, as it turns out, even this observation is not surprising. This is close to the expected outcome 
from the strategic removal of five data points from the southeast quadrant of a 75-point 
                                                
11 The predictive regression coefficient is -4.86 (t = -1.67, p<0.10) for value-weighted returns and -11.62 (t = -2.09, 
p<0.05) for equal-weighted returns. 
12 For value-weighted returns, dropping the five data points attenuates the coefficient by 57.61%, from -6.44 to -
2.73. For equal-weighted returns, the attenuation is 27.62%, from -11.91 to -8.62). Butler et al. report that the 
coefficient drops all the way to -2.06 for value-weighted returns and to -6.53 for equal-weighted returns (see their 
Table 3), but this is because they restandardize the equity share after dropping five data points. Because these were 
also extreme values of X, dropping them reduces the standard deviation, increases the variance of the restandardized 
variable, and lowers the coefficient. To allow for an apples-to-apples comparison, we do not restandardize. 
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scatterplot that begins with an R2 of only 10% to 15%. To illustrate this formally, we run 
simulations to trace out the expected attenuation of a predictive regression coefficient under 
various “outlier” removal schemes. 
The design choice in these simulations is how to characterize the five data points that 
Butler et al. actually remove. Once that is done, we can replicate the spirit of the process and 
estimate the associated attenuation. We consider two data-removal schemes. The first springs 
from the observation that the data points Butler et al. remove include five of the seven lowest 
value-weighted returns, and five of the six lowest equal-weighted returns. Pseudo market timing 
or not, it is well known that removing extreme values of the dependent variable (henceforth r to 
match our earlier notation) will attenuate the OLS coefficient.13  
Accordingly, in our first set of simulations, we draw samples of 75 data points, where the 
independent variable (henceforth X) and r match the R2 of the predictive regression of the equity 
share for value-weighted and equal-weighted market returns. We then remove observations with 
the most extreme realizations of r. Note that this scheme is somewhat more aggressive than the 
Butler et al. procedure in the sense that it picks off exactly the most extreme returns, but it is less 
aggressive in that it does not identify “outliers” based on X, only on r. 
The second data removal scheme is more strategic, and more closely matches what Butler 
et al. have effectively done. As it turns out, they delete five data points from the southeast 
quadrant of the scatterplot. Thus, the data are identified from both realizations of X and r. This 
                                                
13 For example, see Goldberger (1981) for the derivation of a simple analytic solution for the OLS coefficient b in a 
truncated sample: 
( ) bb θρ
θ
−−
=
11
*
2  
where θ is the ratio of the variance of r in the truncated sample to the variance of r in the full sample and ρ2 is the 
coefficient of determination, or the population R2. The attenuation is largest when the R2 is low and the truncation 
leads to a large reduction in the variance of r. This characterizes the large-sample attenuation, but provides some 
intuition for the situations where we would expect to find bias in a small sample. 
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scheme is likely to attenuate a negative coefficient—again, pseudo market timing or not—even 
more than the first scheme. 
In the second set of simulations, we start by removing the data point from the southeast 
quadrant (or equivalently from the northeast quadrant if X and r are positively correlated) with 
the most negative value of -Xt·et. This is the most influential point in the southeast quadrant. In 
other words, it exerts the most downward pressure the regression line. Next, we refit the line 
with the remaining 74 data points, and remove the new most influential point from the southeast 
quadrant, the new most negative value of -Xt·et. We continue this process of refitting the 
regression line and removing data. When applied to the original data set, the first five data points 
removed by this process are precisely the five years removed by Butler et al.14 Therefore, this 
scheme should yield a fairly accurate approximation of the attenuation that is to be expected 
upon removing data points “like” 1929, 1930, 1931, 1973, and 1974. 
 Figure 2 shows the expected attenuation, and 95% confidence intervals, under these data 
removal schemes. Panels A and B show simulations set up to match the case of value-weighted 
returns, and Panels C and D consider equal-weighted returns. In each panel, the diamond shows 
the actual attenuation Butler et al. find upon removing 6.67% (5/75) data points. The basic 
finding is that the observed attenuation is unsurprising. For instance, Panel C shows that when 
the 6.67% most extreme returns are deleted from scatterplots corresponding to the case of equal-
weighted returns, the expected attenuation is almost exactly that which Butler et al. actually find. 
In the case of value-weighted returns in Panel A, the diamond is also within the 95% confidence 
band. Panels B and D are more relevant, because they better capture Butler et al.’s effective data 
removal scheme. The expected attenuation grows even faster in this scheme. And for both equal- 
                                                
14 We do not suggest that this is how Butler et al. actually selected the five data points they remove. Our goal is 
simply to characterize, as accurately as possible, data points “like” those observations.  
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and value-weighted returns, the observed attenuation is not unusual. It is larger than expected for 
value-weighted returns, though easily within the confidence interval, and even a bit smaller than 
expected for equal-weighted returns.15 
 Thus, the first Butler et al. exercise does not tell us much about either small-sample bias 
or sensitivity to outliers. However, it does raise a legitimate question as to whether the equity 
share is driven by a small number of years. One approach to answering this question is to remove 
the most extreme values of X, as opposed to data points least consistent with the null hypothesis. 
The idea is that this process will mechanically increase standard errors by reducing the variance 
of the predictor, but, if the predictive power is widespread, should not attenuate the regression 
coefficient. Using this approach, we find that removing the top and bottom equity share years 
changes the coefficient in the value-weighted predictive regression from -6.44 to -5.88; removing 
the top and bottom five years gives a coefficient of -3.52; and even removing the top and bottom 
ten years gives a coefficient of -4.94. The coefficient is negative for every case in between. 
Figure 3 shows similar results for the equal-weighted case: There, the coefficient is actually 
larger once one removes the 20 most extreme realizations of the equity share. Clearly, this 
exercise shows that the coefficient is not sensitive to a few extreme equity share years.  
Another standard approach to examining the effect of extreme values is to use median 
regression. Coefficient estimates in median regressions are both larger in absolute value, at -7.51 
(t = -2.39) and -13.20 (t = -3.88), respectively, than they are in OLS regressions. 
We have made several points in this section. To summarize, the observations that Butler 
et al. remove cannot logically be attached to pseudo market timing as opposed to genuine market 
                                                
15 The expected values in Panels B and D are still somewhat understated. Butler et al. remove the five most 
influential data points from the southeast quadrant of the scatter plot, but these turn out to be five of the seven most 
influential value-weighted data points and five of the six most influential equal-weighted data points overall, when 
we consider observations from both the northwest and southeast quadrants. The simulation exercise only removes 
data from the southeast quadrant, which on average will only contain five of the ten most influential data points. 
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timing; the whole approach of identifying small-sample bias by removing data points that are 
more or less “predictable” is dubious; the sensitivity to outliers, as Butler et al. identify them, is 
not unusual for such low R2 regressions; and, more standard robustness tests indicate that the 
predictive power of the equity share is fairly widespread. 
B.  Post-1975 period 
In their second exercise, Butler et al. (2004a) suggest that the evidence for market timing 
should be stronger after the inclusion of Nasdaq in the CRSP aggregates, but in fact the equity 
share has little predictive power in this subsample (see their Table 5). Butler et al. offer this as 
indirect evidence that the pseudo market timing bias drives the full-sample relationship. 
While this exercise again sheds no direct light on small-sample bias, it is a useful 
observation about robustness. One can learn more by probing further. Note that the equity share 
controls for total external finance by construction, but the cost of this virtue is that the variable is 
sensitive to debt market conditions. And, as it turns out, the post-1975 period has seen a secular 
shift toward debt issues. In the mid-1980s, debt issues increase almost fivefold, from 68 to 328 
billion dollars, in the five years from 1983 to 1988 (see Baker and Wurgler (2000) Figure 1). 
Baker and Wurgler speculate that the growth in debt issues arises because of the emergence of 
the junk bond market and a shortening in average debt maturities. Neither has much to do with 
the state of the public equity markets, and so the equity share has become a less useful predictor 
in recent years as a result. For example, at the end of 1999, the equity share was at 0.14, well 
below its full-sample (or post-1975) mean, but few would characterize the equity issuance 
market as “below average” at this point. 
The growth in equity issues from a five-year moving average is not contaminated by the 
secular shift in debt issues, and so is arguably a more consistent indicator of equity issuance 
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activity over the last few decades. Table 3 shows that detrended equity issues predicts both 
equal- and value-weighted returns in the post-1975 period. In fact, the coefficient in the recent 
period is larger in absolute value—at -12.28 for value-weighted returns and -21.47 for equal-
weighted returns—than for the full sample period. The t-statistics are smaller, at -1.93 and -1.99, 
in large part because the recent sample is only 28 years long. In summary, while the equity share 
has not been useful in the recent period, this appears to be due to developments in the debt 
market that contaminate the variable, not to a general breakdown in the relationship between 
equity issuance and future returns. 
C.  Separating debt and equity issues 
Genuine market timing logically implies the substitution of debt, if it is more efficiently 
priced, for equity, Butler et al. argue. In their third exercise, they partition the sample into four 
parts according the growth rate of equity and debt issuance over the past year. There is little 
difference in the future stock market returns across the four groups. In particular, the difference 
in value-weighted returns between high equity growth/low debt growth years and low equity 
growth/high debt growth years is a statistically insignificant -4.14% (see their Table 6). 
This is a peculiar test, because by definition the equity share already captures a first-order 
substitution effect. A high value of the variable indicates a high volume of equity issues relative 
to debt issues, and this in turn forecasts low equity returns, much as Butler et al. envision should 
occur. Their notion of substitution is akin to a second derivative. That is, they sort on the relative 
growth rates of equity and debt issues, which amounts to a sort on the change in the equity 
share—when equity issues grow faster than debt issues, the equity share goes up, and vice-versa. 
But the change in the equity share does not predict returns nearly as well as the level, and we can 
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see no reason that it should.16 In any case, for present purposes the main point is that this test 
again has little direct bearing on small-sample bias. 
D.  Out-of-sample forecasts 
In their fourth and final analysis, Butler et al. consider the equity share’s out-of-sample 
predictive ability. They point out that under pseudo market timing, no out-of-sample 
predictability should be present. They report that the equity share has little out-of-sample 
predictive power (see their Table 7), consistent with pseudo market timing. 
The authors fail to mention that out-of-sample predictability is not a necessary 
implication of genuine market timing, either, so the test is again not very relevant. The question 
asked by Baker and Wurgler (2000) is whether managers systematically issue more equity before 
low market returns. For this hypothesis to be true, there need not be any out-of-sample 
predictability.  
For example, suppose that an increase in the equity share genuinely predicts lower future 
returns in every subsample, but the degree of predictability varies over time. This would be the 
case if there were occasional and significant corrections. (It would also be the case if the 
aggregate market were more efficiently priced in some parts of the sample than in others.) 
Within a period that contains a correction, the predictability or, to be precise, the coefficient in a 
regression of future returns on the equity share will be large in absolute value. Within a period 
that does not contain a significant correction, the coefficient will be small, but still negative.  
                                                
16 To the extent that studying the relative growth rates of equity and debt issuance is informative, we make two 
further comments. First, the Butler et al. test gives more favorable results when one defines growth in issuance as a 
difference from a five-year moving average. This may give a better match with the frequency and duration of actual 
financing cycles. Using this definition, the difference between the off-diagonal groups becomes -9.89% for value-
weighted returns and -19.50% for equal-weighted returns, and the latter difference is significant at the five percent 
level. Second, the growth rates of equity and debt issues are positively correlated, but a horse race predictive 
regression suggests that it is indeed growth of equity issues that predicts returns. Tables are available on request. 
 25
In this example, the power of the equity share to predict future returns is clearly genuine, 
and yet a test for out-of-sample predictability may find none. The reason is that the out-of-
sample approach means using a small coefficient, from past 10-year rolling estimations for 
example, to explain periods where the level of predictability is high. The small coefficient is a bit 
better than a simple past average, but not much. More damaging to out-of-sample performance, 
the approach also means using a large coefficient to explain periods of returns where the level of 
predictability is low. This can be much worse than a simple past average. So, it is conceivable 
that equity issuance could reliably predict returns within each subsample, benefiting managers 
and existing shareholders, while at the same time the information contained in the equity share 
might not be nearly as valuable to outside investors. 
The correct test of whether managers systematically issue more equity before low market 
returns is simply to look back and ask how managers performed. And by this metric, as reported 
in Baker and Wurgler (2000), they timed their equity issues fairly well when measured over the 
whole sample period. The bottom line is that the out-of-sample test, while likely of interest to an 
outside investor, does not even begin with the power to reject genuine market timing in favor of 
pseudo market timing.17 
As far as the actual out-of-sample predictability of the equity share is concerned, it is 
worth a brief note that other authors have found considerably more than Butler et al. For 
instance, Goyal and Welch (2004) study fifteen annual time-series predictors, and report that the 
best (and only statistically significant) out-of-sample predictor is the equity share. Rapach and 
Wohar (2004) study nine annual time-series predictors, and again report that for one-year-ahead 
stock returns, the strongest out-of-sample performance is turned in by the equity share.  
                                                
17 Goyal and Welch (2004) also make this observation. “Baker and Wurgler (2000) are interested in the behavior of 
firms themselves, not with the prediction that outside investors may follow. Thus, they are appropriately interested 
in in-sample outperformance, not out-of-sample outperformance.” (p. 5)  
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An effort to reconcile these claims is beyond the scope of this paper, because the outcome 
would shed little light on small-sample bias anyway, but Table 4 reports a simple test. We use all 
historical data available in each year, starting with 1940, to form out-of-sample predictions with 
the equity share and with a simple past average. Panels A and B show that the equity share 
reduces the annual root mean squared prediction error by 0.40% for value-weighted returns and 
0.89% for equal-weighted returns.18 The in-sample reduction in root mean squared error in the 
post-1940 period is only slightly larger, at 0.46% and 1.20%, respectively. Note that the only 
area where the equity share performs poorly out of sample is the post-1975 period, which is 
exactly where it performs poorly in sample. (Note that an in sample regression cannot increase 
the root mean squared error.) Panels C and D shows that when using the growth in gross equity 
issues from a five-year moving average, the out of sample performance even in recent decades is 
respectable. This indicates that the equity share, and equity issues more generally, perform 
similarly well out of sample and in sample.  
E. Summing up 
We have considered each line of analysis in Butler et al. (2004a), the study that motivated 
our investigation of aggregate pseudo market timing. We find their selective pruning of outliers 
problematic on several grounds. Their post-1975 results point to a decline in the usefulness 
equity share variable, but not to a breakdown in the broader relationship between aggregate 
equity issuance and returns. Their test for a substitution effect overlooks the fact that the equity 
share already captures a more basic notion of substitution, and their out-of-sample exercise does 
not even start with power to reject genuine market timing in favor of pseudo market timing. 
                                                
18 This is opposite to the results of Butler et al., who tend to find better results for the unconditional (constant) 
model. The difference appears to reflect their choice to use a rolling pre-estimation window, as opposed to all of the 
available historical data. Because the sample begins in 1927, this design choice has the effect of discarding the 
information from the earliest observations, including the Great Crash, from most of the analysis. 
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Ultimately, because these exercises are not closely related to the bias of interest, they do not 
present a conflict with our simulation results. All of the evidence that actually speaks to the 
question indicates that the predictive power of aggregate equity issues for stock market returns is 
not due to small-sample bias. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 The aggregate version of Schultz’s (2003) pseudo market timing bias represents a 
potentially serious concern for many studies that use aggregate managerial decision variables to 
predict market-level returns. Butler et al. (2004a) consider this bias in the specific context of the 
equity share in new issues variable, but there are also a number of other results in the prior 
literature that a priori are equally likely to be affected by the bias. These include predictive 
regressions based on planned investment growth, the maturity of new debt issues, aggregate 
insider buying, and the aggregate dividend initiation rate.  
In this paper, we start by pointing out that the aggregate pseudo market timing bias is a 
new name for the small-sample bias long known to affect predictive regressions based on scaled-
price predictors such as the dividend yield. Prior work shows how to estimate the bias using 
simulation methods. We run such simulations, and find that the bias is, in practice, minor for all 
of the predictive regression settings we consider. Indeed, small-sample bias is particularly 
negligible for the equity share variable. Overall, the results bolster a growing body of evidence 
that managerial decisions respond to securities market conditions.19 
                                                
19 To what extent successful market timing is intentional as opposed to a more passive response to investor demand 
or market liquidity is an open question. For an example, see Baker and Stein (2004). 
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Figure 1. Pseudo-market timing and predictability. We simulate 50,000 estimates from the following system of 
equations under the null hypothesis of no predictability (b=0): 
ttmt ubEar ++= −1 , ttt vdEcE ++= −1  
where r is the value-weighted stock market return and E is the ratio of equity issues to total equity and debt issues. 
See Table 1 for details. The graph is a histogram of realizations of b. The diamond shows the location of the actual 
OLS estimate on the X axis. We impose the null hypothesis of no predictability (b = 0) in all cases. Otherwise, the 
parameters vary as follows. Panel A uses the in-sample bias-adjusted OLS estimate for d and the OLS estimate for 
ρuv. Panel B uses the in-sample OLS estimate for d and sets ρuv equal to one, leaving the standard deviation of u and 
v unchanged. Panel C increases the bias-adjusted OLS estimate for d by three OLS standard deviations. Panel D 
reduces the sample size to 10.  
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Figure 2. Removing outliers from low R-squared regressions.  We simulate estimates of a univariate regression 
with 75 observations where the independent variable and the errors are drawn from normal distributions: 
ttt ebXar ++= , where ( )XNX σ,0~  and ( )eNe σ,0~ , and where 75=N  
We choose relative values of b<0, σX and σe to match the R2 of the regressions of aggregate value-weighted returns 
(R2 = 0.098 in Panels A and B) and equal-weighted market returns (R2 = 0.149 in Panels C and D) on the ratio of 
equity issues to total equity and debt issues. We draw 100,000 sets of 75 observations, throwing out sets with R2’s 
that fall outside a narrow band (0.094<R2<0.102 for Panels A and B; 0.144<R2<0.154 for Panels C and D). Bands 
are constructed to contain 10% of R2’s, so roughly 10,000 sets of 75 observations remain. The solid line shows the 
mean and the dashed lines show a 95 percent confidence interval for the attenuation toward zero of the OLS estimate 
of b. In Panels A and C, we remove extreme values of rt, starting with the largest in absolute value. In Panels B and 
D, we strategically remove extreme values of rt, starting with the largest realization of –Xt·et where Xt is positive (the 
most influential point from the southeast quadrant of the r-X scatterplot) and sequentially removing the next largest 
realizations of –Xt·et from the sequentially re-estimated regressions. The diamond shows the combination of data 
removed and the reduction in the OLS estimate when Butler et al. (2004) remove five (or 6.67%) of 75 observations. 
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Panel C. Removal of extreme rt, R2 = 0.149 Panel D. Strategic removal of data, R2 = 0.149 
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Figure 3. Removing extreme values of the equity share.  We estimate the relationship between the equity share in 
new issues and future value-weighted and equal-weighted market returns, progressively removing the most extreme 
values of the equity share: 
ttmt ubEar ++= −1 . 
The lines starts at the left with the full sample OLS coefficient (-6.44 for value-weighted returns, and -11.92 for 
equal-weighted returns). We remove the data points containing the top and bottom values of the equity share and re-
estimate the OLS coefficient with the remaining sample; then we remove the top and bottom two data points; and so 
on. The solid line uses value-weighted returns and the dashed line uses equal weighted returns. 
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Table 1. Pseudo-market timing and predictability. We simulate 50,000 estimates from the following system of 
equations: 
ttmt ubEar ++= −1 , ttt vdEcE ++= −1  
where r is the aggregate market return, either equal- or value-weighted, and E is one of two measures of equity 
issues. The equity share in new issues is the ratio of equity issues to total equity and debt issues. Detrended equity 
issues is the log difference between the level of equity issues and the average level of equity issues in the previous 
five years. Both are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. We simulate 100+T values for r and E 
starting with the actual E0 and drawing with replacement from the empirical joint distribution of u and v. We throw 
away the first 100 values, leaving us with a sample size of T. We use OLS estimates of b for 50,000 separate 
samples, reporting the average and locating the actual OLS estimate in this simulated distribution with one- and two-
tailed p-values. We impose the null hypothesis of no predictability (b = 0) in all cases. The parameters are as 
follows. The first row in each panel uses the in-sample bias-adjusted OLS estimate for d and the OLS estimate for 
ρuv. The second row uses the in-sample OLS estimate for d and sets ρuv equal to one, leaving the other distributional 
properties of u and v unchanged. The third row increases the bias-adjusted OLS estimate for d by three OLS 
standard deviations. The fourth row reduces the sample size to 10. The fifth through eighth rows repeat this for 
equal-weighted returns. 
 
 Parameter Inputs Simulation versus Actual Results 
 d ρuv T 
Average 
Coefficient 
Actual 
Coefficient 
Average/
Actual (%) 
One-Tail 
p-value 
Two-Tail 
p-value
Panel A. Equity Share in New Issues  = EI / (EI + DI) 
VW 0.507 0.138 75 -0.07 -6.44 1.03 [0.004] [0.007] 
VW 0.507 1.000 75 -0.73 -6.44 11.37 [0.011] [0.011] 
VW 0.819 1.000 75 -1.06 -6.44 16.43 [0.007] [0.007] 
VW 0.819 1.000 10 -7.38 -6.44 114.59 [0.511] [0.519] 
EW 0.507 0.132 75 -0.10 -11.92 0.83 [0.001] [0.001] 
EW 0.507 1.000 75 -1.08 -11.92 9.10 [0.002] [0.002] 
EW 0.819 1.000 75 -1.52 -11.92 12.79 [0.001] [0.001] 
EW 0.819 1.000 10 -10.73 -11.92 90.05 [0.406] [0.411] 
Panel B. Detrended Equity Issues = log (5⋅EI / (EI-1+EI-2+EI-3+EI-4+EI-5)) 
VW 0.581 0.201 70 -0.24 -7.83 3.10 [0.010] [0.015] 
VW 0.581 1.000 70 -1.16 -7.83 14.79 [0.020] [0.020] 
VW 0.801 1.000 70 -1.49 -7.83 18.99 [0.016] [0.016] 
VW 0.801 1.000 10 -9.80 -7.83 125.22 [0.543] [0.554] 
EW 0.581 0.200 70 -0.36 -16.50 2.16 [0.001] [0.001] 
EW 0.581 1.000 70 -1.62 -16.50 9.82 [0.001] [0.001] 
EW 0.801 1.000 70 -2.06 -16.50 12.48 [0.001] [0.001] 
EW 0.801 1.000 10 -13.70 -16.50 83.05 [0.375] [0.378] 
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Table 2. Pseudo-market timing and predictability using other corporate decisions. We simulate 50,000 
estimates from the following system of equations: 
ttt ubXar ++= −1 , ttt vdXcX ++= −1  
where r is an aggregate market return and X is a predictor variable. We use rt to denote the return in year t and Rt+k 
to denote the k-year cumulative return that starts with the year t return. We consider the following pairs of market 
returns and predictor variables: stock returns from March of t to February of t+1 and investment plans from Lamont 
(2000); stock returns and insider trading from Seyhun (1998); the three-year return on long bonds over treasuries 
and the long-term share of debt issues from Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003), and the three-year return of 
payers minus nonpayers and the rate of dividend initiation from Baker and Wurgler (2004). The independent 
variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. We simulate 100+T values for r and P starting with 
the actual P0 and drawing with replacement from the empirical joint distribution of u and v. We throw away the first 
100 values, leaving us with a sample size of T. For the three-year returns, we use a sample size of T/3. We use OLS 
estimates of b for 5,000 separate samples, reporting the average and locating the actual OLS estimate in this 
simulated distribution with one- and two-tailed p-values. We impose the null hypothesis of no predictability (b = 0) 
in all cases. The parameters in each panel are as follows. The first row uses the in-sample bias-adjusted OLS 
estimate for d and the OLS estimate for ρuv. The second row uses the in-sample OLS estimate for d and sets ρuv 
equal to one, leaving the other distributional properties of u and v unchanged. The third row increases the bias-
adjusted OLS estimate for d by three OLS standard deviations or to 0.95 (2.7 standard deviations for Panel B and 2.5 
standard deviations in Panel C), whichever is lower. The fourth row reduces the sample size to 10. 
 
 Parameter Inputs Simulation versus Actual Results 
 d ρuv T 
Average 
Coefficient 
Actual 
Coefficient 
Average/
Actual (%) 
One-Tail 
p-value 
Two-Tail 
p-value
Panel A. Investment Plans, t = 1948 through 1992, from Lamont (2000) 
rmt 0.088 0.120 45 0.00 -7.15 -0.05 [0.001] [0.001] 
rmt 0.088 1.000 45 -0.36 -7.15 5.08 [0.000] [0.000] 
rmt 0.545 1.000 45 -0.72 -7.15 10.13 [0.001] [0.001] 
rmt 0.545 1.000 10 -3.17 -7.15 44.32 [0.162] [0.165] 
Panel B. Insider Trading, t = 1976 through 1994, from Seyhun (1998) 
rmt 0.358 -0.770 19 1.14 4.99 22.79 [0.105] [0.116] 
rmt 0.358 -1.000 19 1.37 4.99 27.51 [0.111] [0.115] 
rmt 0.950 -1.000 19 2.94 4.99 58.91 [0.182] [0.182] 
rmt 0.950 -1.000 10 5.13 4.99 102.86 [0.469] [0.470] 
Panel C. Long-term Share in Debt Issues, t = 1954 through 1998, from Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (1999) 
RGLt+3-RGSt+3 0.616 0.255 15 -0.84 -10.07 8.33 [0.029] [0.036] 
RGLt+3-RGSt+3 0.616 1.000 15 -3.24 -10.07 32.20 [0.063] [0.063] 
RGLt+3-RGSt+3 0.950 1.000 15 -4.92 -10.07 48.89 [0.112] [0.112] 
RGLt+3-RGSt+3 0.950 1.000 10 -6.87 -10.07 68.21 [0.245] [0.246] 
Panel D. Dividend Initiations, t = 1964 through 1998, from Baker and Wurgler (1999) 
RDt+3-RNDt+3 0.510 0.354 12 -2.35 -24.76 9.48 [0.044] [0.063] 
RDt+3-RNDt+3 0.510 1.000 12 -7.46 -24.76 30.13 [0.059] [0.059] 
RDt+3-RNDt+3 0.918 1.000 12 -12.16 -24.76 49.11 [0.112] [0.112] 
RDt+3-RNDt+3 0.918 1.000 10 -13.81 -24.76 55.79 [0.170] [0.170] 
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Table 4. Out of sample performance: Improvement in Root Mean Squared Error. Root mean squared 
prediction error from out-of-sample and in-sample predictions. The first three columns report results using a rolling 
out-of-sample prediction strategy. In the first row, we use all available data up to 1940 and run two regressions of 
aggregate market returns, either equal- or value-weighted, on a constant and on a constant along with one of two 
measures of past equity issues. We use the parameters of these two regressions and the 1940 value of equity issues 
to form two predictions for 1941. We repeat this process for 1942-2002. We report the square root of the average 
squared prediction error and report the reduction in prediction errors from conditioning on equity issues. In the 
second row, we start with all available data up to 1950, and so on. The second three columns report results from in-
sample prediction. In the first row, we use data from 1941 through 2002 and run two regressions of aggregate 
market returns, either equal- or value-weighted, on a constant and on a constant along with one of two measures of 
past equity issues. We use the parameters of these two regressions to form two sets of predictions for 1941-2002. 
We report the square root of the average squared prediction error and report the reduction in prediction errors from 
conditioning on equity issues. In the second row, we start with data from 1951 through 2002, and so on. 
 
 Out of Sample In Sample 
Start Year E Constant Difference E Constant Difference 
Panel A. Value-Weighted Returns, Equity Share in New Issues 
1940 17.53 17.93 -0.40 17.19 17.65 -0.46 
1950 17.45 17.78 -0.34 17.15 17.57 -0.42 
1960 16.87 17.20 -0.32 16.37 16.93 -0.56 
1970 17.49 17.67 -0.18 17.04 17.47 -0.42 
1980 17.40 16.15 1.24 16.00 16.00 0.00 
1990 18.83 18.16 0.67 17.89 17.98 -0.09 
Panel B. Equal-Weighted Returns, Equity Share in New Issues 
1940 24.49 25.38 -0.89 23.72 24.93 -1.20 
1950 23.99 24.63 -0.64 23.20 24.14 -0.94 
1960 24.33 24.79 -0.45 23.18 24.24 -1.06 
1970 23.34 22.87 0.48 21.70 22.29 -0.58 
1980 23.84 19.52 4.32 18.74 18.76 -0.02 
1990 20.48 18.58 1.90 18.30 18.44 -0.14 
Panel C. Value-Weighted Returns, Detrended Equity Issues 
1940 17.39 17.93 -0.54 16.69 17.65 -0.96 
1950 17.27 17.78 -0.51 16.83 17.57 -0.74 
1960 16.48 17.20 -0.72 16.03 16.93 -0.90 
1970 17.22 17.67 -0.46 16.98 17.47 -0.48 
1980 15.75 16.15 -0.40 15.45 16.00 -0.56 
1990 17.64 18.16 -0.51 17.24 17.98 -0.74 
Panel D. Equal-Weighted Returns, Detrended Equity Issues 
1940 23.72 25.38 -1.65 22.78 24.93 -2.15 
1950 23.05 24.63 -1.57 22.54 24.14 -1.60 
1960 22.82 24.79 -1.96 22.26 24.24 -1.99 
1970 21.08 22.87 -1.79 20.69 22.29 -1.60 
1980 18.51 19.52 -1.01 18.17 18.76 -0.59 
1990 16.93 18.58 -1.65 16.39 18.44 -2.05 
 
